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1. Toward a ‘Science of Teams’ 
The title of the book, “Theories of Team Cognition:  Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives”, 
hints at a broader agenda, one both rich with promise and fraught with potential troubles.  
Teamwork lies at the nexus of a variety of disciplines interests.  Cognitive and social 
psychology, organization science, human factors research, communication studies, to 
name a few, all have scholarly interests related to the functioning of groups and teams.  
Given this convergence of interest, it would seem mutually advantageous to find ways of 
sharing insights across fields.  The current volume seeks to engender just such a 
conversation.  It endeavors to do so by trying to articulate the assumptions and 
“theoretical drivers” that motivate and undergird research within these disciplines.  It 
represents a first step toward advancing this kind of conversation within an area of study 
that already has an overabundance of ways of formulating its topic, e.g. “distributed 
cognition” (Hutchins, 2006), “group cognition” (Stahl, 2006), “macrocognition” 
(Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995; Klein et al., 2003; Letsky & Warner, 2008), “socially-
shared cognition” (Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001), 
“team learning” (Senge, 1990), not to mention, “team cognition” (Salas & Fiore, 2004).   
By creating a taxonomy of theoretical models and seeking to identify areas of overlap 
between them, it is hoped that progress can be made toward integrating basic findings 
related to the performance of teams.  
 
In this way, the book addresses a larger agenda, one intended to eventually lead to a 
‘science of teams’, a science that would eventually enable us to make positive 
recommendations regarding how teams should function.  This would require establishing 
an agreed upon theoretical vocabulary and set of measurement methods.  Taken for 
granted within this larger enterprise is a shared allegiance to a way of conducting 
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research that entails: [1] formulating an abstract model of what counts as the 
phenomenon of interest, [2] constructing operational means of measurement, and [3] 
using these measures to test hypotheses about how the matter, so construed, might be 
done better.  The disciplines currently participating in the conversation on teamwork (i.e., 
cognitive and social psychology, management science, communication studies) all have 
a strong psychological orientation.  However, as we expand the circle of participation 
wider and reach out to other disciplines, some problems begin to emerge.  It becomes 
apparent that this strategy of beginning from a base of theoretical constructions is not 
one that is universally embraced across the human sciences. Indeed, some social 
scientists reject this kind of approach categorically and on principle.  We will examine 
one critique of formal theorizing in the social sciences and point out its relevance to the 
task of constructing a science of teams.  We offer a sample of an alternative form of 
analysis and suggest a framework for what might be termed a ‘hybrid’ approach to 
studying teams.   
 
2. Garfinkel’s Critique of the Parsonian Theory of Action  
As a discipline, sociology is centrally concerned with explicating the basis of society and 
social structure.  It addresses the classical Hobbesian question of how it happens that 
our interaction with others is, for the most part, orderly.  A historically important position 
on this question was that developed by Talcott Parsons.  The state of the discipline in 
the early part of the 20th century, as Parsons described it, resembled the contemporary 
literature on teamwork.  He (1937) reported “there are as many systems of sociological 
theory as there are sociologists” and lamented “there is no common basis” (p. 774).  
Parsons sought to rectify this.  His ambition was to not only to develop a unifying 
theoretical base for sociology, but one that would serve for all the “sciences of action” (p. 
769)—economics, political science, psychology.  In a volume that profoundly shaped 
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sociological inquiry for half a century, Parsons (1937) surveyed the writings of four 
prominent social theorists of the previous century and proposed a unified framework for 
studying social action.1   His approach was based on the study of “the elementary unit 
act” (p. 768).  By his account, this unit act could be analyzed in terms of four more 
fundamental components:  
(1) [The act] implies an agent, an actor.  (2) For purposes of definition, the act must 
have an end, a future state of affairs toward which the process of action is oriented.  
(3) It must be initiated in a situation or which the trends of development differ in one 
or more important respects from the state of affairs to which the action is oriented, 
the end.  The situation is in turn analyzable into two elements: those over which the 
actor has no control, that is which he cannot alter, or prevent from being altered, in 
conformity with his end, and those over which he has such control.  The former may 
be termed the conditions of action, the latter the means.  Finally, (4) there is 
inherent in the conception of this unit, in its analytical uses, a certain mode of 
relationship between these elements.  That is, in the choice of alternatives, there is 
a “normative orientation” of action.  Within the area of control of the actor, the 
means employed cannot, in general, be conceived either as chosen at random or 
as dependent exclusively on the conditions of action, but must in some sense be 
subject to the influence of an independent, determinate selective factor, a 
knowledge of which is necessary to the understanding of the concrete course of 
action.  (pp. 44-45, emphasis added)    
Parsons believed a science of human action could be constructed on the basis of an 
analysis of this sort. 
 
By including subjective elements such as perceived “ends”, “normative orientations” and 
choice amongst alternatives, he sought to incorporate the perspective of the actor into 
his model.  It was to be a model whereby action was not strictly determined by 
environmental conditions but reflected some form of choice on the part of the actor.  
Thus, Parsons entitled his approach “the voluntaristic theory of action” (p. 62).  The 
actor’s choices in this model, however, are guided by socially-accepted norms of 
conduct.  Parsons defined an end as, “a future state of affairs to which action is oriented 
by virtue of the fact that it is deemed desirable by the actor(s)” (p. 75).  A norm, 
therefore, “is a verbal description of the concrete course of action thus regarded as 
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desirable, combined with an injunction to make certain future actions conform to this 
course” (p. 75).  Action, from the observer’s perspective, is made meaningful in the light 
of such norms, though Parsons’ model does not require that the agent necessarily be 
mindful of these socially-prescribed norms when acting.  Parsons endeavored to 
construct a means of studying action, one that could still meet the standards of an 
empirical science and provide a basis for prediction. His approach was thoroughgoing 
and elegant.  As an effort to unify existing social theory, it was a tour de force.    
 
Harold Garfinkel, one of Parsons’ students, had certain reservations with regard to the 
program put forth by his mentor.  The Parsonian ‘theory of action’, in Garfinkel’s view, 
was curiously detached from the practicalities of what people actually do.  Garfinkel 
(1952) charged that the Parsonian actor inhabits “a world-by-definition” and explained:    
This world is populated not with persons but with puppets.  These puppets are 
creatures of [the theorist’s] own design: ideal types.  (p. 58, author’s emphasis) 
Garfinkel protested, however, that actors are not “judgmental dopes” (p. 259)—they are 
not simply following rules or complying with normative standards. The model advanced 
by Parsons, he argued, fails to engage the forms of practical reasoning actually 
employed by actors within their social arrangements.  Social order, for Garfinkel, is an 
actors’ achievement and something that needs to be investigated within their vernacular 
world.  He argued that any situation can  “be viewed as self-organizing with respect to 
the intelligible character of its own appearances as either representations of or as 
evidences-of-a-social-order” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33). In place of Parsons’ hypothesized 
action frame, we find a proposal to instead look at how members themselves actually 
produce their social settings as understandable. “The argument that meaning requires 
order, and the empirical elaboration of how this is achieved through sequential devices 
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and reflexive attention, are Garfinkel’s unique contribution to social theory” (Rawls, 2008, 
p. 703).  
  
Garfinkel overturned Parsons’ program of system building and replaced it with an 
empirical one devoted to describing the processes through which actors themselves 
construct meaningful worlds.  He directs our attention to how actors produce their 
actions as sensible and competent.   “The design of social actions so that others can 
make sense of them is an indispensible feature of social action, for unless it is possible 
for people to recognize 'ordinary social facts', they would not be capable of mutually 
adjusting their conduct with respect to one another in commonplace settings”   (Button & 
Sharrock, 1998, p. 75).  These kinds of design and recognition, it might be noted, are 
also prerequisites to any form of teamwork.  Garfinkel made several additional 
observations pertaining to the self-organizing character of social activity.  
 
Social settings are organized in very particular ways.  Garfinkel noted, “Any setting 
organizes its activities to make its properties as an organized environment of practical 
activities detectable, countable, recordable, reportable, tell-a-story-aboutable, 
analyzable—in short, accountable” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33, author’s emphasis).  He 
located the key to addressing the Hobbesian problem of order in participants’ practical 
reasoning, specifically their methods of accounting for their own actions.  This notion, the 
notion of accountability, is one of fundamental importance to his approach to doing 
sociology. Actions “are not only done, they are done so that they can be seen to have 
been done” (Button & Sharrock, 1998, p. 75).  Participants’ actions are produced in ways 
that make them recognizable for what they are and, in producing the actions in just that 
way, members offer an account of what they are doing. When Garfinkel speaks of 
accountability, therefore, he is concerned with “the ways in which actions are organized: 
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that is, put together as publicly observable, reportable occurrences”  (Button & Sharrock, 
1998, p. 75, authors’ emphasis).   
 
Actions are accountable in the ways in which they document or give an account of 
themselves.  But they are accountable in another way, as well.   In ordinary parlance we 
use the term accountable in the sense of being responsible one to another.  This usage 
has a normative character.   As Garfinkel (1967) explained, “In exactly the way that 
persons are members to organized affairs, they are engaged in serious and practical 
work of detecting, demonstrating, persuading through displays in the ordinary occasions 
of their interactions the appearances of consistent, coherent, clear, chosen, planful 
arrangements” (p. 34).  Members are obliged to produce their actions in ways that will 
appear sensible to others.  Actions are accountable, therefore, both in the sense of 
offering an account of themselves and in the sense that they are obliged to be performed 
one particular way and not another. 
    
We have methods for doing this. As Garfinkel expressed it, “In exactly the ways in which 
a setting is organized, it consists of methods whereby its members are provided with 
accounts of the setting as countable, storyable, proverbial, comparable, picturable, 
representable—i.e., accountable events” (p. 34, author’s emphasis).  Heritage (1984) 
describes Garfinkel’s approach as a “cognitive-moral” (p. 120) one.  It leads to a different 
form of sociological analysis:  
Garfinkel consequently turns the problem of social order into a concern with how 
people organize social actions so that others can make sense of them, so that each 
person involved in an interaction can identify the actions being performed by 
others—and thus comprehend the relationship of the actions to the complex of 
activity under whose auspices they are done, and whose implementation they 
comprise.   (Button & Sharrock, 1998, p. 75) 
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Agents’ orientations to their own actions held little relevance to Parsons’ analytic 
framework, but for Garfinkel, accounts are not only important as material for analysis, 
but also play a critical role in the creation and maintenance of the social organization 
itself (Heritage, 1984, p. 34 et passim).   Garfinkel proposed the name 
ethnomethodology for this approach to doing sociology, one that focuses on the details 
of how participants accountably produce their actions as sensible.  It begins from his 
policy that they have methods for doing so. The task for sociology, from Garfinkel’s 
perspective, is one of explicating what these methods might be. 
 
3.  The Accountabilities of the Tool Pass 
To illustrate how an ethnomethodologically-informed analysis of team cognition might 
proceed, we offer a concrete example.  We focus here on the forms of accountability 
made visible in a simple act, the passing of a tool from a scrub nurse to a surgeon during 
the course of a surgical procedure.2   It would be hard to find a setting more deeply 
steeped in regulation and accountability than the operating theatre.  We look here at two 
examples of tool passing and show how they might be analyzed in terms of how 
participants offer accounts of what they are doing through their actions. 
 
<<insert Excerpt 1 about here>> 
 
Excerpt 1 provides an abbreviated transcript from an observed operation.3  The 
transcribed fragment comes from a ‘keyhole’ surgical procedure.  This means that rather 
than laying the patient open, the operative procedure was carried out using instruments 
inserted through small ‘ports’ in the patient’s side.  As seen in Figure 1, the surgeon (S) 
and the scrub nurse (N) were positioned on opposite sides of the operating table.  Video 
monitors were placed across the table from each enabling them to view the interior 
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space of the patient’s body.4   In the excerpted fragment, the surgeon extracted a tool 
from the patient’s body while issuing a request for a “clip applier” (line 3).  His request 
took the form of a specifying expression and an adverb  (“please”).  To satisfy the 
request, his respondent must resolve the referring expression.  Sanchez Svensson 
(2005) noted that there is no standardized nomenclature for surgical instruments. 
Naming conventions may vary from hospital to hospital and from surgeon to surgeon.  
The tools of surgery may be known by a variety of names based on function, the 
inventor of the instrument, the place where it was invented, etc.   
 
<<insert Figure 1 about here>> 
 
Tool changes occur frequently during the conduct of a surgical procedure and small 
inefficiencies would accumulate over the course of the operation.  In this case only 5 sec 
elapsed from the moment that the first tool was withdrawn from the patient’s body to the 
time when the second was placed into service.  The process was executed swiftly and 
with great economy of motion.   
 
Safety and sterility are also important considerations in this setting.  Instruments must be 
handled in ways that avoid contamination. Surgeons often wear two pairs of gloves 
reducing sensitivity.  Care, therefore, must be taken to avoid dropping tools.  Many of the 
instruments are sharp and must be handed off in ways that avoid injury to the parties 
involved.  Further, every instrument  (e.g., scalpel, cautery, scissors, forceps) is 
designed to be held in a specific way.  It falls to the passer to position the tool in the 
hand of the surgeon so that it can be placed into use without need for reorientation or 
examination. 5  In this case, the instrument is almost 50 cm in length with a long, thin 
shaft, a working tip, and a pistol grip on the other end.  The nurse lifted the tool from the 
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end of the shaft, the part that would eventually be inserted into the patient’s body, and 
placed the pistol grip into the surgeon’s outstretched hand. 
 
The choreography of this tool pass resembles that of a handshake. The surgeon’s hand 
and the tool arrive at the same instant meeting in a place midway between the two 
parties (lines 8 and 9).   This level of coordination requires careful monitoring of the 
progress of the ongoing procedure on the part of the scrub nurse and anticipation of 
what will be done next.  Sanchez Svensson (2005) described the situation as follows: 
The smooth accomplishment of the passing of instruments is not simply a matter of 
constantly attending to what others are doing; attentiveness and ‘sensitivity to’ 
others’ conduct is embedded in an understanding of the routine ways of conducting 
procedures and using particular instruments.  It is not that the passing of an 
instrument is an instant response to a request, but an anticipated and organized 
accomplishment in and through the developing course of the participant’s activities. 
(p. 176) 
 
<<insert Excerpt 2 about here>> 
 
We might say that timeliness and accuracy are accountable matters with respect to the 
tool pass, but how would we know that this was the case?  One way that this could be 
demonstrated would be by describing instances in which participants’ expectations were 
violated.  Excerpt 2 contains a transcript of a second tool pass from the same operation.  
As in Excerpt 1, a request was issued (line 3) simultaneous with the withdrawal of a tool 
from the patient’s body (lines 1 and 2) signaling the initiation of a tool pass cycle.  The 
surgeon extended his hand to receive the requested tool (line 4) but, instead of 
delivering a tool, the nurse asked him to repeat his request.  After the surgeon did so, 
the nurse placed the requested tool in his outstretched hand and the operative 
procedure went on.      
  –11– 
 
In this case the choreography of the tool pass seems disrupted.  The surgeon’s hand 
arrived, but there was nothing there to meet it.  Just as an unreciprocated invitation to 
shake hands is an accountable matter, a failure to produce a requested tool is also an 
accountable event. Though she had already selected a tool from the table following the 
request, the nurse did not make it available to the surgeon (see Figure 2). The surgeon’s 
shift of gaze toward the nurse (line 7) inquired into the problem.  By not passing the 
instrument in her hand, the nurse performed an accountable action, one that constituted 
a withholding.  But why did she withhold it?  Because it was the wrong tool, of course.  
Or, more precisely, because she was uncertain that the object in her hand matched the 
surgeon’s specification.   Her withholding evidenced this uncertainty.  
 
The surgeon’s shift in gaze revealed an expectation violated. By continuing to hold his 
hand out, he marked that his request remained open and unsatisfied.  He displayed his 
orientation to timeliness and held the nurse accountable for the delay.  The nurse’s 
withholding of the tool also displayed an expectation violated.  At the stage in the 
procedure in which this exchange occurred, the work consisted of doing blunt dissection 
and applying clips to vessels that are about to be divided.6  A routine sequence of 
instruments, therefore, might be: blunt-tipped forceps, clip applier, followed by a 
scissors.  Though the tool requested by the surgeon is commonly used within the 
procedure, it falls outside of this typical sequence and its use, therefore, would be harder 
to anticipate.  Her withholding of the tool within her hand displayed her accountable 
orientation to producing the correct tool. The nurse and surgeon made their orientation 
to timeliness and accuracy visible to each other and, in so doing, rendered it visible to us 
as well. 
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The actions of both parties stand as an account of how the they viewed their work, how 
they understood what they were doing together, and who they were.  They did these 
things in the way they did, not because they were nurses and surgeons.  Instead, the 
participants presented themselves recognizably and accountably as nurses and 
surgeons by doing these things in just the way that they did. 
 
<<insert Figure 2 about here>> 
 
 
4. A Hybrid Approach to Studying Teamwork  
We have sketched out an example of how an ethnomethodologically-informed analysis 
of teamwork might be done.  By directing attention to the accountable methods through 
which members of the team produced their actions, Garfinkel offers us a different way to 
theorize our topic.  Rawls (2003) writes: 
Garfinkel has opened the way for a new sort of theorizing.  …  There is no reason, 
in principle, why theorists cannot be faithful to the phenomena; no reason why they 
have to proceed in generic terms.  Garfinkel has shown us the possibility of 
empirical theorizing and it is in these terms that I was to refer to Garfinkel as one of 
the great social theorists of the twentieth century.  (p. 145) 
Built into Garfinkel’s ‘empirical theoretic’ approach is an entirely different treatment of 
shared cognition. 
 
Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001) wrote, “the concept of shared cognition can help us to 
explain what separates effective from ineffective teams by suggesting that in effective 
teams, members have similar or compatible knowledge, and that they use this 
knowledge to guide their (coordinated) behavior” (p. 196).  A variety of names have been 
attached to the forms of knowledge underlying team performance—“teamwork 
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competency” (Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1997), “team knowledge” (Cooke, Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers, Stout, 2000), “team mental models” (Mohammed & Dumville, 2001), 
“team situational awareness” (Stout, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2001),  “transactive 
memory” (Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004).  These different formulations reflect different 
theoretical orientations and would seem to suggest that there might be a variety of 
different kinds of knowledge relevant to the work of teams.   Whatever the nature of the 
knowledge, however, there seems to be widespread agreement that some form of 
knowledge sharing is essential to coordinated action. 
 
Garfinkel (1952) wrote: 
The big question is not whether actors understand each other or not.  The fact is 
that they do understand each other, that they will understand each other but the 
catch is that they will understand each other regardless of how they would be 
understood. … The big question for the “problem of understanding” is thus the 
question of describing the conditions under which men do in fact perceive each 
other in the ways that they do.  (pp. 367-368, author’s emphasis) 
Rather than attempting to codify what knowledge is shared, Garfinkel focuses on the 
organizational details of how the sharing gets done.  As Schegloff (1991), recounted,  
“what seemed programmatically promising to Garfinkel was a procedural sense of 
common or shared, a set of practices by which actions and stances could be predicated 
on and displayed as oriented to 'knowledge held in common'—knowledge that might 
thereby be reconfirmed, modified, and expanded” (pp. 151-152).  The eponymous 
methods studied by ethnomethodologists are the procedures whereby shared 
understandings are created, negotiated, and sustained. 
 
The question that motivates this book concerns how might we begin to rigorously and 
scientifically study the work of teams.  Teams have been defined as, “a distinguishable 
set of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively 
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toward a common and valued goal/object/mission, who have each been assigned 
specific roles or functions to perform, and who have a limited life span of membership” 
(Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannebaum, 1992, p. 126-127, quoted in Cooke et al., 
2000).  Left unasked, however, is how it is that teams constitute themselves as teams in 
the first place.  How would we begin to investigate such a matter?  In a recent paper, 
Rawls (2008) described what ethnomethodologically-informed “hybrid studies of work” 
might contribute to organizational studies.  Her recommendations, however, apply with 
equal force to the study of teams.  Drawing on Garfinkel’s writings, Rawls describes how 
not only teams, but all social groups are constituted.  She notes, Garfinkel “proposes 
that situated actors, engaged in constructing a sequential order of meaning, constitute a 
group only when, and only for as long as, the sequential character of the interaction in 
which they are currently engaged requires of them collectively a mutual commitment to 
constitutive properties of the situation” (p. 707).  This was quite evident in the two 
instances of tool passing that we examined earlier.  The nurse and surgeon displayed a 
mutual orientation to the accountabilities of the task at hand.  
 
Hybrid studies of work focus upon just how a local sense of orderliness is produced.  
This is seen, not in a study of abstracted features, but rather in the study of how 
participants make visible the accountable aspects of their concerted activity.  Rawls 
writes, a “focus on detail in habits and routines does not look for order, nor treat 
meaning, intelligibility or mutual action as a matter of order”  (p. 706).  “The workers are 
pictured as managing to enact just the right routines at the just the right time, and the 
question of how they know when or what is not problematized”  (p. 706).  We need to 
look beyond such features to the ordering accountabilities that lie behind.  She 
proposes, “What is required for the study of how this order is jointly made is a method 
that preserves the contingencies of its local production, those sequential details oriented 
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toward by workers in doing their work and a theory treating these contingencies 
themselves, not the routines and habits an observer might see ‘sedimenting’ from them, 
as essential”  (p. 706).   
 
When any specific case is reduced to a count-able within an externally-imposed 
theoretical category, we risk loosing our grasp of the ordering properties of the setting of 
production, its local contingencies, and its observable accountabilities.  This is the basis 
for Garfinkel’s methodological prescription that cases be studied in their practical details. 
He “is interested in how—just how—contingencies are rendered as recognizable objects 
using shared methods that exhibit an immediate order that can be seen in each single 
case” (Rawls, 2008, p. 704, author’s emphasis). To begin to understand the work of 
teams from an actor’s perspective, we need to start collecting study-able instances of 
just what we are taking teamwork to be and augment them with carefully constructed 
analyses designed to document the vernacular methods by which the participants carry 
out their work.  The enterprise is empirically grounded, not only in the sense that it 
directly studies teamwork as a naturally-occurring phenomenon, but also because it 
retains a record of the circumstances under which each analyzed instance arose (much 
as we have done here with the tool pass examples).  This enables the reader of an 
account to reconstruct the analyzed event and thereby evaluate the adequacy of its 
analysis.7 
  
Teams become teams in the ways that members locally manage the accountabilities and 
contingencies that shape their work.   To develop a grasp of the “just whatness” of 
teamwork, it needs to be studied as a “thing-in-its-details” (Garfinkel & Livingston, 2003, 
p. 23).  This represents a proposal for an “incommensurable, asymmetric, and alternate” 
(Garfinkel, 2002, p. 192) approach to building a science of teams.      
  –16– 
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6. Endnotes 
                                                
1 His book, The Structure of Social Action, examined and sought to integrate the writings of Alfred 
Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber.  Durkheim and Weber are 
foundational theorists in sociology.  The other two, Marshall and Pareto, were polymaths, also 
known for their contributions in economics and social philosophy. 
2 Garfinkel and Livingston (2003) use formatted queues as an everyday example of a 
methodically-ordered social activity.  Heritage (1984, Chap. 5) uses the example of a greeting 
exchange.  Note that issuing a greeting or forming a queue are not methods, as we use the term 
here, but instead depend upon an array of more fundamental methods for recognizing that a 
greeting has been issued, for displaying that one is standing in a line, etc.  The same is true for 
tool passes.  
3 The transcripts are prepared using the notational conventions of Conversation Analysis 
(Jefferson, 2004). Spoken speech is presented in bold face to set it off from the other action 
descriptions.  Square brackets mark actions that occur in overlap.  Text enclosed in angle 
brackets (e.g., line 31 in Excerpt 3) was produced at a more rapid tempo than surrounding text.  A 
colon indicates a prolongation of the preceding syllable.  The number enclosed in parentheses in 
line 32 indicates a pause measured in seconds.  Underscoring of the first three letters in “curved” 
indicates stress.  The column to the left contains time code marking the onset of the action 
appearing in that line. 
 
The recording analyzed here comes from the Southern Illinois University Surgical Education 
Video Archive.  This is a collection of videotaped surgeries gathered over a decade at two 
teaching hospitals affiliated with the medical school. Further information about the video archive 
can be found at:  http://www.siumed.edu/call/index.html. 
4 See Mondada (2003) and Koschmann, LeBaron, Goodwin, & Feltovich (2010) for a more 
elaborate discussion of visualization in endoscopic surgeries. 
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5 There is clearly more to it than this.  See Sanchez Svensson, Heath, and Luff (2007) for a 
detailed description of how a particular instrument might be passed in different ways depending 
on the task at hand. 
6 See Koschmann, et al.  (2010) for a more detailed description of this particular operative 
procedure. 
7 This opens into a broader discussion of the ‘validity’ of an analysis, which we will not pursue 
here. Interested readers might consult Seedhouse (2005). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure 1.  Layout of the surgical workspace showing the relative positions of the surgeon 
(S) and the scrub nurse (N) to their respective video monitors. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The surgeon extends his hand and looks to the scrub nurse.  The scrub nurse 
holds a clip applier in her right hand. 
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